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Abstract
In this paper, we search whether the Benford’s law is applicable to monitor daily changes in
sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS) quotes, which are acknowledged to be complex systems
of economic content. This test is of paramount importance since the CDS of a country proxy
its health and probability to default, being associated to an insurance against the event of its
default. We fit the Benford’s law to the daily changes in sovereign CDS spreads for 13 European
countries, – both inside and outside the European Union and European Monetary Union. Two
different tenors for the sovereign CDS contracts are considered: 5 yrs and 10 yrs, – the former
being the reference and most liquid one. The time period under investigation is 2008-2015
which includes the period of distress caused by the European sovereign debt crisis. Moreover,
(i) an analysis over relevant sub-periods is carried out; (ii) several insights are provided also by
implementing the tracking of the Benford’s law over moving windows. The main test for checking
the conformance to Benford’s law is – as usual – the χ2 test, whose values are presented and
discussed for all cases. The analysis is further completed by elaborations based on Chebyshev’s
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distance and Kullback and Leibler’s divergence. The results highlight differences by countries
and tenors. In particular, these results suggest that liquidity seems to be associated to higher
levels of distortion. Greece – representing a peculiar case – shows a very different path with
respect to the other European countries.
Keywords: Benford’s Law, Credit Default Swaps, Complex Systems, Data Science.
1 Introduction
Quantitative phenomena are characterized by numbers, whose values exhibit specific features. For
instance, it is clear that the distribution of individuals’ age in the world is not uniform, implying
that it is more probable to randomly extract a twenty-years old human than a hundred-years old
one. However, deviations from the uniform law have been observed for large dataset also in not
very intuitive contexts. In this respect, the so-called Benford’s law (BL), introduced by Newcomb
(1881) and formalized by Benford (1938), plays a prominent role. BL describes the regularity of the
frequency distribution of leading digits in some important large data set. In particular, it states that
the distribution of first digits is more concentrated on smaller values, and the digit ”one” has the
highest frequency. The story of BL is interestingly traced in Torres et al. (2007), where both the
theoretical advancements from the original formulation and a list of its applications are provided. In
brief, the assertion of the BL is that, once taken a large set of numbers, the first digits distribution
follows a logarithmic law:
P (d) = log10(1 +
1
d
), d = 1, 2, . . . , 9, (1)
where P (d) is the probability that some numbers from the data set have their first digit equal to d;
log10 being the logarithm in base 10. For the reader’s convenience, in Table 1 we show the frequen-
cies of the first digit as given by the BL.
The applications of BL range in a wide set of fields. A list of recent contributions (published after
the list of Torres et al.) should e.g. include To¨dter (2009), Bazzani et al. (2010), Rauch et al.
(2011), De and Sen (2011), Mir (2012, 2014), Mir et al. (2014), Ausloos and Clippe (2012), Ausloos
et al. (2015). In the specific context of financial applications, BL violations might be meaningfully
associated to data misalignments (as much demonstrated by Nigrini 1992, 1996) and toxicity of the
markets, but also to other cases (Ausloos et al. 2015). Some papers are particularly relevant here.
Varian (1972) tested – through BL – the presence of anomalies over a set of land planning data for
777 tracts, roughly corresponding to census tracts in the area of San Francisco Bay: input data (in
year 1967) and forecasts (for years between 1970 and 1990). He found surprisingly, yet somewhat
expected, agreement (not his own words) with BL.
Nigrini (1992, 1996) assessed mistakes over a large collection of accounting data, and explained them
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by invoking frauds or, simply, misprints in the data reporting process (see also Nigrini and Mitter-
meir, 1997). It is also worth noting the contributions of Ley (1996) who studied the stock market
by using Benford’s Law (BL); Realdon (2008) who applied the BL and linked the CDS market to
the stock market, and Carrera (2015) who used BL to analyze numerical patterns in exchange rates
in order to verify whether they appear to have been subject to some degree of policy management.
In line with Abrantes et al. (2011), Judge and Schechter (2009) and Varian (1972), we use the
BL to verify the quality and credibility of CDS data. This is a key issue since CDS are traded
in decentralized Over The Counter (OTC) markets which are often pictured as opaque and with
little information about pricing mechanisms, price settlement and trading volumes. Moreover, we
scientifically move from the perspective of CDS as complex systems (see e.g. Giansante et al., 2012
and Kim and Jung, 2014, where the CDS volatility is studied by adopting a network approach;
supporting arguments on the complex nature of the CDS can be also found in Burns et al., 2013).
In so doing, we are also in line with the literature stating that BL provides an informative content
mainly when the data generating process is a complex system (see e.g. Li et al., 2015).
Here, we adopt a data science perspective, aiming at deciphering the presence of anomalies in the
daily changes of sovereign CDS quotes. There are three main reasons why we chose the sovereign
CDS: first, before the recent crisis, CDS were often lauded as derivative instruments that could sta-
bilize the financial system as a whole because of their portentous risk transferring and risk signaling
abilities. Secondly, the CDS market has grown tremendously over the last decade and is currently
an integral part of the financial system. Thirdly, there is some anecdotal evidence that major banks
manipulated CDS prices. For example, it is worth citing the case of Reuters reporting that big
U.S. banks face CDS manipulation lawsuit1 and the one of US Senator Carl Levin that has accused
Goldman Sachs to manipulate CDS quotes2.
Thus, the up-to-date relevance of the present investigation can be found in the growing importance
of the role played by sovereign CDS in the globalized financial market (Longstaff et al., 2011).
Indeed, after the financial crisis started in 2007 in the United States, financial markets have found
a new concern since the beginning of 2010: the levels of deficits and public debts. All developed
countries, even the largest, are suspected of being able to default on their debt. Rating agencies,
bankers and investment funds have begun to worry about the sustainability of public finances and
required countries to reduce their debt by cutting government spending, especially social spending.
In this context, it can be observed that the recent development of CDS on the debt of developed
countries has launched CDS as tools for estimating the probability of default of the States, although
their quotes are determined on a opaque and poorly regulated market (Jarrow, 2011). As a conse-
quence, the scientific interest for sovereign CDS mainly focuses on a time span which includes the
1http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSL1N0R51TS20140904?irpc=932
2http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/12/10/annals-of-cds-manipulation-goldman-sachs-edition/
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First digit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Frequency 0.301 0.176 0.125 0.097 0.079 0.067 0.058 0.051 0.046
Table 1: Frequencies of the first digit in a set of data – values ranging from 1 to 9, see the first row
– according to BL.
key dates characterizing the financial crisis which is still experienced. Indeed, a considerable number
of sovereign CDS contracts were signed in the early stages of the crisis (2008-2010), particularly on
the wake of the turbulence following the failure of Lehman Brothers. Pre-crisis periods are gener-
ally associated to low volumes of these products. Consequently, the limited meaningfulness of the
analysis of their paths allows us to shorten such considerations in this paper.
A broad range of literature analyzes the CDS market (Bao et al., 2011; Castellano and D’Ecclesia,
2013; Castellano and Scaccia, 2014, only to mention the most recent ones) and, especially in the last
six years, due to the European sovereign debt crisis, the scientific literature has placed more emphasis
on sovereign CDS. Many of the recent studies have found that CDS quotes on debt securities increase
substantially before financial crises become full-blown. However, it is worth to mention that, beyond
its signaling power, the CDS market still poses many questions in relation to its full transparency
and its capacity to spread of market disturbances – mostly on the downside – from one country
to the other. For instance, Afonso et al. (2012) use EU sovereign CDS spreads to carry out an
analysis on the reaction of spreads to announcements from rating agencies. They show that quotes
are sensitive to announcements, and that spillover effects from lower to higher rated countries among
EMU countries, together with persistence effects, can be observed. Longstaff et al. (2011) show that
sovereign CDS quotes are driven more by global market factors, risk premiums, and investment flows
than by country-specific macro-economic fundamentals. In other words, their analysis supports a
view of the sovereign CDS market in which investors play a predominant role.
Some other studies highlight that the price discovery mechanism and the knowledge of actual net
positions of financial institutions are necessary to ensure the transparency of the CDS market (Cont
and Kokholm, 2014).
2 Paper content
The dataset considered in this paper is given by Thomson Reuters Composite Sovereign CDS spreads
for 13 European countries on a daily basis. Countries are distributed in four main groups: a) the
core economies - France Germany, United Kingdom; b) the most worrying economies - Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and Spain; c) the Eastern economies - Croatia, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania - and
Turkey; d) Greece. Spreads are provided for two different tenors: 5 and 10 years. The period under
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investigation is August 2008 - April 2015. Such a period includes the Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy
and the sovereign debt crisis of developed countries, which are associated to increasing level of signed
sovereign CDS contracts and to the interest in the analysis of their paths. The resulting time series
gives then an amount of 42,000 spread observations.
The conformance between daily changes in CDS spreads and BL has been checked by performing
two different typologies of procedures. First, for both tenors (5 and 10 years) a χ2 test has been
implemented over the entire period and over four noticeable sub-periods : (i) August 8, 2008 -
April 25, 2015; (ii) August 8, 2008 - January 1, 2010; (iii) January 1, 2010 - October 31, 2013; (iv)
November 1, 2013 - April 25, 2015; (v) January 1, 2010 - April 25, 2015. Such sub-periods were
chosen to highlight the time span of the European sovereign debt crisis and the one that preceded
it. Second, for the reference contract (5 years), a BL conformity track has been implemented by
computing three statistical indicators over moving windows of 120 days length, with 60 days overlap:
a χ2 test, the Chebyshev’s distance and the Kullback and Leibler’s divergence.
It will be shown that several insights can be derived from the analysis: first of all, there is much
evidence of conformity with BL, but not in all cases. In particular, the BL validity hypothesis can
be accepted for a wide set of countries, but only in the 10 yrs tenor case. Differently, BL is rather
systematically violated in the case of most liquid products, i.e. in the 5 yrs tenor case. The core
economies show remarkable discrepancies with respect to BL, suggesting a major deviation of the
daily changes sovereign CDS spreads. It seems also that such violations are more evident after 2010,
and this leads to conjecture the presence of a relationship between the financial distress and non
conformity of CDS data to BL. Greece can be viewed as a very special case, in that it follows a very
different path with respect to the other European countries.
Of course, we cannot exclude the presence of scale effects biasing the obtained results. In fact, CDS
quotes can be very shallow since net and gross CDS volumes for all the tenors represent typically a
small fraction of the outstanding government debt. In this respect, the most liquid one – i.e. the
5yrs-CDS – represents an even smaller fraction of the total outstanding debt. Thus, the evolution
of CDS spreads might be driven more by liquidity constraints than by movements in the underlying
sovereign risk perception. Anyway, for a definitive validation, a scale effect conjecture deserves
further investigations, which are beyond the scopes of this paper.
Thus, this paper is organized as follows: Section 3 contains the description of the experiments, along
with the presentation of the used dataset. In Section 3, the main results of the experiment are
discussed. Section 4 offers some concluding remarks through a discussion of the results.
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3 Experiments
In this section, we describe the empirical experiments carried out for testing the conformity of the
daily changes in CDS spreads with the BL. First, the used dataset is introduced: for a better
understanding of the data scales, the main descriptive statistics are reported (see Subsection 3.1).
Furthermore, for the reader’s convenience, we recall the definition of CDS and their main properties.
Second, the adopted methodological tools are listed and discussed. The procedures implemented
for analyzing the deviations between the first digit of the CDS spreads and BL distribution are also
presented (see Subsection 3.2).
3.1 Data
We use daily Thomson Reuters Composite Sovereign CDS spreads of 13 European countries pro-
vided by Data Stream, both inside and outside the European Union and European Monetary Union.
Thomson Reuters is fairly acknowledged as one of the leading data providers of CDS quotes. The
Thomson Reuters end-of-day composite spreads are calculated by a standard aggregation of the
prices contributed by major market makers. With respect to individual dealer’s prices, the aggre-
gated (composite) prices allow a more comprehensive perspective on the market (Mayordomo et al.,
2014).
We use daily CDS spreads in basis points3 (bps.) and two different tenors (5 and 10 years), starting
from August 2008 to April 2015.
The time series considers 1,750 days, which results in a total of 42,000 spread observations. We recall
that we consider four sets of countries, as indicated here above : a) the core economies - France
Germany, United Kingdom; b) the most worrying economies - Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain; c)
the Eastern economies - Croatia, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania - and Turkey; d) Greece. The
first two groups contain countries on the basis of their credit risk: the first contains countries with a
credit rating of at least ”A”, while the second group contains all CDS entities rated worse than ”A”.
The third considers a specific geographical area, Eastern economies and Turkey, while the fourth
contains only Greece, - which is the first European country that has experienced in 2012 a partial
default after the constituency of the currency union.
The time interval for such a study is taken as a whole: (i) August 8, 2008 - April 25, 2015, but
it is also useful to consider special subclasses: (ii) August 8, 2008 - January 1, 2010; (iii) January
1, 2010 - October 31, 2013; (iv) November 1, 2013 - April 25, 2015, and the (v) January 1, 2010 -
April 25, 2015 which regroups the latter two time periods. The analysis was conducted also on the
sub-periods of the considered time span to highlight whether the advent of the sovereign crisis may
have been one cause of the major/minor conformance of the daily changes in CDS quotes with BL.
3A basis point (bp) is equal to1/100th of 1%.
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The European sovereign debt crisis is, indeed, a multi-year crisis that has been taking place through
successive stages since the end of 2009. Especially during the period (iii), it is common knowledge
that the ”most worrying economies”, faced a strong rise in spreads as the result of a widespread
concern about their future debt sustainability.
During period (iv), European CDS quotes have shown, with respect to period (iii), a downward
trend in the CDS spread level, with the only exception of Greece and Turkey. Table 2 (here inserted
as Fig.2) reports some descriptive statistics and shows that after the large upward jump observed
during period (iii), the CDS quotes of the core economies, together with worrying economies and
eastern economies, experienced a tendency to decrease. For instance, the mean 5 years German
tenor decreased from 53.06 to 20.44 bps.; the corresponding Italian one from 282.42 to 127.17 bps
and the Portuguese from 601.71 to 204.92, only to mention some of them. It is worth to mention
that a large downward jump is observed also in the historical volatility (i.e. standard deviation).
For reader’s convenience, at this stage, it is fair to recall what a CDS is aimed at and its
general properties. Generally speaking, a CDS is an agreement between two parties (the buyer
and the seller). The buyer pays a periodic premium, usually quarterly or semiannual, to hedge an
underlying security, a loan or a bond, against the default of the issuer. Upon the default of the issuer,
the seller commits herself/himself to pay the amount the buyer will not recover from the default
procedure. As a result of this agreement, the buyer of a CDS receives credit protection, whereas
its seller guarantees the creditworthiness of the underlying debt security. So, the risk of default is
transferred from the holder of the fixed income instrument to the seller of the swap. When CDS are
used to hedge against the default (or downgrade) of a State, they are called in jargon ”sovereign
CDS”.
The Credit Default Swap (CDS), because of their above mentioned structure, implicitly embed
forward-looking information about the creditworthiness of the issuer, – given that CDS spreads
are no more than the cost of credit risk insurance. At the same time, CDS market is the source of
regulatory concerns due to its size and lack of transparency. As a matter of fact, the CDS market is a
decentralized unregulated OTC market in which detailed information about the pricing mechanisms
is rather scarce and contracts often get traded so much that it is hard to know who stands at either
end of a transaction (Cont and Kokholm, 2014; Cont, 2010).
Therefore, in order to investigate the (possible) presence of irregularities in the CDS market more
closely, we make use of the empirical Benford’s distribution, Eq. (1), and analyze daily changes
in sovereign CDS quotes for the mentioned European countries, inside and outside the European
Union and European Monetary Union, in time intervals admittedly characterized by the effects of
the sovereign debt crisis. We will find that CDS spreads depart significantly from the expected
Benford’s reference distribution, raising potential concerns relative to the unbiased nature of the
warning signals related with sovereign risk coming from the CDS market.
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3.2 Methodology
In the case of the daily changes in sovereign CDS quotes, the statistical assessment of the closeness
between the observed distribution of digits and the corresponding values of BL is verified by using 3
different approaches. First, the χ2 test is computed on the overall sample and on the sub-periods (ii)-
(v) introduced in Subsection 3.1. In doing so, we are able to statistically observe whether the data
fit the BL, at a given confidence level. Then, we compute the Chebyshev’s distance and the Kullback
and Leibler’s divergence in moving windows, in order to track the time-dependence consistency of
the observed frequencies with the ones associated to BL.
The χ2 test is one of the most used statistical tools for checking whenever a series of data satisfy a
hypothesis, here the BL. In the first digit case, there are nine possible outcomes – ranging from 1
to 9 – since zero cannot be viewed as a significant first digit of a number. Thus, we deal with n = 9
values and n− 1 = 8 degrees of freedom for the χ2 test, according to the formula:
χ2(8) =
9∑
i=1
(
N
(i)
obs −N (i)BL
)2
N
(i)
BL
, (2)
where N
(i)
obs is the number of observations of the i-th digit and N
(i)
BL is the related theoretical one
suggested by the BL, for each i = 1, . . . , 9.
The critical values of the χ2 test with 8 degrees of freedom and the corresponding level of confidence
are used to identify the acceptance region. In the case of significance level of 0.05 and 8 degrees of
freedom, the critical value of the χ2 test is 15.507. If the χ2 test – calculated as in (2) – is below
such a critical value, then the null hypothesis of consistency of the data with the BL is accepted at
a significance level of 0.05.
The Chebyshev’s distance between two discrete probability distributions is given as:
dC(Pobs, PBL) = max
i=1,...,9
|p(i)obs − p(i)BL|, (3)
where, – in the peculiar case we deal with here, Pobs =
(
p
(1)
obs, . . . , p
(9)
obs
)
is the vector of the observed
frequencies for the first digit, while PBL =
(
p
(1)
BL, . . . , p
(9)
BL
)
is the one associated to BL.
By adopting the same notation, the Kullback and Leibler’s divergence between the observed and BL
frequencies is:
dKL(Pobs, PBL) =
9∑
i=1
p
(i)
obs ln
(
p
(i)
obs
p
(i)
BL
)
. (4)
The interpretation of the Chebyshev’s distance can be easily grasped when looking at formula (3).
It is easily argued that a high value of dC(Pobs, PBL) indicates that there exists i = 1, . . . , 9 such
that p
(i)
obs and p
(i)
BL are remarkably different. A contrario, a low value of dC(Pobs, PBL) is associated
to small deviations of p
(i)
obs from p
(i)
BL, for each i = 1, . . . , 9. The extreme cases are dC(Pobs, PBL) = 0
– when Pobs ≡ PBL in a component-wise sense – and dC(Pobs, PBL) = max
i
|p(i)BL| = |p(1)BL| – when
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p
(1)
obs = 0.
The Kullback and Leibler’s divergence measures the information loss when Pobs is taken as an
approximation of the first digit distribution given by PBL. Then, dKL contributes to a correct
evaluation of the entity of the deviation of a set of data from BL when the first digit is considered.
Therefore, the Kullback and Leibler’s divergence can be interpreted as a proxy of the degree of
opaqueness of the CDS market.
Next, we propose to examine the Chebyshev’s distance and the Kullback and Leibler’s divergence in
the view of a time track of the transparency of sovereign CDS market. For this aim, 90-days rolling
windows have been considered, with a moving time of 45 days. The initial date is August 8, 2008
and the terminal one is April 25, 2015, whence leading to examine 38 time windows.
4 Results
This section contains a critical reading of the results of the analysis. We proceed by considering first
the whole period along with its four subperiods, and then a moving window approach.
4.1 Whole time interval and its subperiods
Table 3 (here inserted as Fig.3) collects the values of χ2 tests and related p-values for the considered
13 countries when the overall time interval and the four sub-periods (ii)-(v) are taken into account.
Fixed a significance level of 0.05, Table 3 (inserted as Fig.3) shows that – when considering the
entire period – the null hypothesis of BL is in general verified only in the case of 10 yrs tenor and not in
the 5 yrs one. This is true especially for France (the p-value is about 0.95) and Czech Republic (0.97),
but also for Portugal (0.89), UK (0.80), Croatia (0.80), Spain (0.78), Ireland (0.71). This outcome
suggests that 5 yrs CDS spreads are probably the most ”manipulated” ones. After all, it is useful
to underline that these discrepancies occur mainly in the commonly accepted reference contract,
being the 5 yrs tenor the most liquid in the CDS market. Greece represents the only exception,
with BL holding only for the changes in 5 yrs CDS quotes with a p-value of 0.94, decreasing to
0.75 in the case of 10 yrs contracts. However, Greece is also a very peculiar case, not only because
of missing data, but also due to a persistent economic distress which characterizes all the periods
under investigation. BL is violated for Germany, Poland, Italy, Romania and Turkey in both tenor
cases. It is also worth to remark here that the data of all the core economies present a remarkable
discrepancy with BL in the case of 5 yrs tenor. These findings again suggest that the most liquid
contracts – as the 5 yrs tenors for the core economies – are those more easily ”manipulable”. The
analysis of sub-periods provides more insights on when data show a higher deviation from BL. The
values of the χ2 tests are higher (and BL is more likely violated) over the sub-period 2010-2015 for
all the considered countries and tenors, with the only exception of the 4 Eastern European Countries
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(Croatia, Czech Republic, Poland and Romania). However, focusing on the sub-periods 2010-2013
and 2013-2015, it is possible to identify – by comparing the former period with the latter one –
a wider discrepancy with BL for Germany, UK, Czech Republic (5 yrs tenor) and Germany, Italy,
Romania, Turkey (10 yrs tenor), a lower distortion for Italy, Croatia, Poland, Romania, Turkey (5
yrs tenor) and France, Ireland, Poland, (10 yrs case). Moreover, with the exception of Greece, the
daily changes in 5 yrs tenors CDS spreads never satisfy BL. In particular, splitting 2010-2015 in two
sub-periods (iii)-(iv) does not seem to produce any striking result allowing us to identify a sub-period
in which the violations of BL for core economies occur, whence allowing us to conclude that such
BL violations are rather uniform and pervasive. Completely different is the outcome of the analysis
for the sub-period 2008-2010. In this case, the distribution of the data is generally closer to BL,
especially for the 5 yrs tenor case, suggesting that data may have been objects of ”manipulation”
after 2010.
4.2 Rolling windows
In order to better identify periods in which the distribution of sovereign 5 yrs CDS quotes deviates
from BL, we performed an analysis on moving windows to test the closeness of the distributions for
rolling two months periods. The tracking of the χ2 tests by countries are reported in Table 4, (here
inserted as Fig.4) where the values of the test by country and moving window are reported.
Considering a significance level of 0.05, an overview of the results suggests mixing evidence.
Some windows are associated to a great departure from the BL (see e.g. the high values of the
χ2 test over the windows XXVIII-XXXIII for the core economies, over the windows XXVI-XXVII
for Croatia, XXXI-XXXVII for Poland) while in other ones there is concordance with BL (see e.g.
window III for France, XII for Germany, IV for UK, VIII for Italy and the very low value of χ2 test
– i.e.: 1.49 – in the first window for Portugal). It seems that the distance between the distributions
tends to increase with respect to time, as is evidenced by Figure 1, graphics a-c, where a trend line
is superimposed on the temporal evolution of the values of the χ2 test. With the Czech Republic
and Turkey exceptions, the group Eastern economies + Turkey shows the same tendency, that is the
distance between the two distributions increases when one gets closer to the advent of the sovereign
debt crisis (see Table 4 (inserted as Fig.4) and Figure 1, d-h). Similar results are obtained in the
case of countries which are in the group of the worrying economies (see Table 4 (inserted as Fig.4)
and Figure 1, i-m). In summary, contrary to what happens for the group of worrying economies, it
seems that CDS quotes of core economies have been ”manipulated”, with increasing evidence during
the European debt crisis.
Finally, Tables 5 and 6 (here inserted as Figs. 5 and 6) show respectively the values of the Cheby-
shev’s distance and Kullback and Leibler’s divergence by moving window and country.
The tracking of the Chebyshev’s distance (see Table 5 (here inserted as Fig. 5)) and the Kullback
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Figure 1: Linear trends for the χ2 tests over the moving windows
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and Leibler’s divergence (see Table 6 (inserted as Fig. 6)), confirm some of the above mentioned
results (for the discordance case see e.g., in Table 5 (here inserted as Fig. 5), the high values
in windows XXVIII-XXX for the core economies, in window XXVI for Croatia, XXXI-XXXII for
Poland and, for Table 6 (inserted as Fig. 6), windows XXVIII-XXXI for Germany and UK, windows
XXVI-XXVII for Croatia and XXXI-XXXIII for Poland; for the concordance with BL see e.g.
window I for Portugal and window III for France in both Tables). Furthermore, Table 5 and Table
6 (here inserted as Fig. 5 and Fig. 6) allow us to add some conclusion to previous results. This
is possible because the Chebyshev’s distance captures the largest deviation between the empirical
frequencies of the numerical values of the first digits and those associated to BL, while the Kullback
and Leibler’s divergence represents a proxy of the information loss due to the approximation of the
BL through the empirical frequencies of the first digits. In this respect, Table 5 (here inserted as
Fig. 5) shows that the Chebyshev’s distance ranges over a rather narrow interval. However, it seems
to assume higher values in the most recent rolling windows for some core countries (Germany and
UK), exhibits a U-shape form in the case of Italy and Poland while it is a reversed U-shape in the
remarkable case of Greece (but notice the large amount of missing data). In terms of levels, it is
important to note that Germany, UK, Czech Republic and Poland exhibit very high maximum values
of the Chebyshev’s distance (more than 0.18). This evidence suggests that in some rolling windows
BL is violated because 1 – the most frequent first digit – appears less than BL would suggest. The
countries whose sovereign CDS exhibit the smallest maximum deviation from BL are Portugal and
Turkey.
Looking at Table 6 (here inserted as Fig. 6), it can be observed that there exists a positive trend for
UK, Poland, Romania and Turkey. For these countries, the information loss in explaining BL through
the empirical distributions is very large for the most recent rolling windows. A few countries (UK,
Czech Republic and Poland) show a rather high value of the maximum of the Kullback and Leibler’s
divergence (more than 0.27, with the peak of UK at 0.37), suggesting a higher level of deviation over
some sub-periods. Differently, Italy and Portugal seem to exhibit less distorted distribution.
5 Conclusions
In this article, we adopt a data science perspective and discuss the validity of the BL for some
European sovereign CDS over a eight years period, which includes the current financial crisis. We
have dealt with this issue by adopting different points of view. Firstly, a global analysis over the
entire period on the fitting of BL with the daily changes in CDS for the first digits has been per-
formed. Secondly, further elaborations have been performed by clustering the reference period into
four meaningful sub-periods. Moreover, a tracking study has been carried out by considering a
moving window approach. We illustrated the usefulness of BL to study the data quality of sovereign
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CDS. The employed statistical tools have been the χ2 test – which provides a general goodness-
of-fit measure, the Chebyshev’s distance – leading to results on the specific changing of the most
manipulated digit value and the Kullback and Leibler’s divergence which is a measure of the loss of
information in passing by BL to empirical frequencies.
Results suggest that the most liquid contracts seem to be the most ”manipulated” ones, and devi-
ations involve mainly the core economies and the 5 yrs tenor case. It is worth to note that Greece
follows a very different path with respect to the other European countries. Furthermore, ”manipu-
lations” seem to have occurred mainly after the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis.
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 Spread 5yrs Spread10 yrs Spread 5yrs Spread10 yrs Spread 5yrs Spread10 yrs Spread 5yrs Spread10 yrs Spread 5yrs Spread10 yrs
Core Economies
France Mean 79.69 107.07 11.18 14.90 107.63 132.22 46.74 99.72 90.67 123.17
Median 66.84 104.33 3.88 5.00 83.88 129.00 46.62 104.33 73.87 104.33
St. Dev. 52.33 55.24 16.61 21.89 52.98 55.13 5.22 7.67 52.71 49.20
Min 11.00 16.55 1.50 2.94 29.27 33.10 34.15 85.30 29.27 33.10
Max 252.50 257.58 97.90 208.75 252.50 257.58 57.34 129.00 252.50 257.58
Germany Mean 41.82 61.68 10.97 13.48 53.06 74.88 20.44 48.85 43.97 67.63
Median 35.16 53.02 4.38 5.78 43.09 68.13 20.42 53.02 37.46 60.90
St. Dev. 24.52 26.72 14.51 15.79 24.44 26.10 2.75 6.64 25.44 25.29
Min 7.00 11.50 1.63 2.29 19.04 29.97 13.41 37.03 13.41 29.97
Max 119.17 141.89 90.78 91.23 119.17 141.89 26.41 62.66 119.17 141.89
United Kingdom Mean 56.61 76.26 76.26 82.68 62.80 80.33 22.03 59.98 51.45 74.67
Median 56.49 73.51 71.13 77.83 63.57 78.81 20.66 66.46 52.09 72.95
St. Dev. 28.58 19.75 35.24 31.91 18.24 12.34 2.92 9.95 24.02 14.85
Min 16.50 24.08 16.50 24.08 26.00 56.86 17.18 44.04 17.18 44.04
Max 164.02 160.91 164.02 160.91 104.00 120.31 30.68 66.46 104.0000 120.31
Worrying Economies
Ireland Mean 283.22 283.22 88.89 91.23 420.41 384.55 68.80 147.29 322.49 318.47
Median 173.74 203.68 11.00 16.26 426.10 399.12 54.97 168.99 188.67 218.22
St. Dev. 248.66 187.67 101.59 96.77 243.79 181.72 25.89 33.65 260.61 188.29
Min 11.00 16.26 5.19 8.89 110.30 116.10 41.50 87.90 41.50 87.90
Max 1180.50 1062.50 387.05 368.67 1180.50 1062.50 128.81 187.65 1180.50 1062.50
Italy Mean 211.09 237.32 31.03 42.00 282.42 290.75 127.17 220.76 239.18 271.26
Median 171.22 232.31 9.83 21.13 248.06 290.01 123.15 232.31 195.94 232.31
St. Dev. 129.52 117.54 42.98 44.74 128.08 119.69 27.95 22.46 129.99 107.04
Min 39.25 49.13 5.55 9.28 89.92 93.28 81.51 154.06 81.51 93.28
Max 593.75 568.86 198.91 225.40 593.75 568.86 202.67 290.01 593.75 568.86
Portugal Mean 404.75 403.24 23.72 31.81 601.71 548.70 204.92 331.28 491.20 488.15
Median 324.72 363.35 7.38 14.17 478.32 484.13 185.12 363.35 394.01 425.29
St. Dev. 340.79 266.67 30.96 32.21 328.39 248.96 65.88 55.41 332.65 234.66
Min 37.00 46.25 4.02 6.13 80.67 87.33 110.09 177.85 80.67 87.33
Max 1514.79 1069.21 160.13 157.47 1514.79 1069.21 370.70 477.94 1514.79 1069.21
Spain Mean 212.52 236.17 26.79 29.84 302.41 307.98 99.96 189.34 246.03 274.94
Median 200.83 205.59 3.67 6.75 271.45 309.32 93.99 205.00 236.04 255.20
St. Dev. 136.61 118.71 37.35 38.07 114.78 101.12 28.66 26.63 134.06 101.99
Min 36.17 45.75 2.55 1.94 94.12 91.01 54.34 130.86 54.34 91.01
Max 640.33 575.78 168.43 178.75 640.33 575.78 179.35 309.32 640.33 575.78
Eastern Economies
Croatia Mean 314.94 206.29 150.59 77.14 331.47 211.60 288.79 142.53 319.58 192.36
Median 287.08 174.30 101.50 36.33 300.61 180.08 273.97 132.44 290.00 164.41
St. Dev. 98.71 102.64 131.11 107.63 102.14 92.95 36.14 18.43 90.85 85.36
Min 81.17 21.50 15.08 4.00 179.67 81.37 239.34 132.44 179.67 81.37
Max 593.84 581.40 593.84 581.40 585.23 459.30 380.97 205.59 585.23 459.30
Czech Rep. Mean 91.80 108.87 59.76 65.17 93.87 110.79 49.69 80.29 81.57 102.30
Median 82.10 94.13 29.00 42.50 88.62 99.97 45.84 78.94 76.37 91.23
St. Dev. 48.13 42.48 72.37 69.67 31.24 31.76 7.11 2.97 33.32 30.28
Min 39.00 50.01 3.41 8.67 52.55 61.83 42.85 78.94 42.85 61.83
Max 350.00 346.00 350.00 346.00 195.83 218.24 62.17 90.03 195.83 218.24
Poland Mean 138.01 168.12 56.80 68.12 148.79 181.23 68.14 118.64 126.33 163.80
Median 125.00 143.67 39.50 55.50 140.94 163.83 66.18 116.16 104.34 141.70
St. Dev. 71.43 62.19 64.98 61.24 60.12 58.42 8.27 4.67 62.72 57.06
Min 52.67 69.17 7.67 14.34 67.58 91.32 53.16 114.46 53.16 91.32
Max 415.00 395.67 415.00 395.67 336.83 373.32 87.34 132.21 336.83 373.32
Romania Mean 285.19 313.22 178.41 199.21 292.69 317.36 149.77 214.93 252.89 288.83
Median 253.67 274.44 132.00 161.17 280.17 294.73 145.82 211.65 228.05 258.26
St. Dev. 132.7449205 115.28 169.83 167.23 83.61 77.96 25.63 6.29 96.60 80.65
Min 103.26 193.00 17.25 27.75 175.67 193.00 103.26 209.54 103.26 193.00
Max 769.46 749.30 769.46 749.30 492.26 513.27 195.70 244.93 492.26 513.27
Turkey
Turkey Mean 217.84 251.01 454.96 502.04 187.65 224.07 200.79 247.60 191.31 230.63
Median 192.48 234.12 325.75 379.00 175.37 208.05 193.45 240.25 183.24 228.52
St. Dev. 86.27 76.42 305.32 287.91 49.48 49.58 25.12 22.51 44.46 45.00
Min 111.66 147.61 116.55 176.76 111.66 147.61 155.16 210.37 111.66 147.61
Max 829.36 828.72 1416.88 1385.00 343.67 374.17 274.51 318.63 343.67 374.17
Greece
Greece Mean 1377.96 2740.24 44.16 55.98 2094.97 2956.76 673.53 4617.41 1699.10 3419.25
Median 957.16 4617.41 12.75 23.33 3060.28 4617.41 456.63 4617.41 1064.53 4617.41
St. Dev. 1196.93 2049.63 66.22 67.77 1107.32 1876.25 289.31 0.00 1146.29 1758.90
Min 50.00 60.75 5.25 10.63 248.00 246.33 432.98 4617.41 248.00 246.33
Max 5034.45 4617.41 290.00 285.17 5034.45 4617.41 1064.53 4617.41 5034.45 4617.41
*not available data
August 8, 2008 - April 25 ,2015 January 1, 2010 - April 25, 2015January 1, 2010 - October 31, 2013August 8, 2008 - January 1, 2010 November 1, 2013 - April 25, 2015
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the considered time series 
Figure 2:
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Table 3. Chi squared test by country and time interval. In italics the p-values, the asterisks  represent missing 
data. 
 
5yrs 10 yrs 5yrs 10 yrs 5yrs 10 yrs 5yrs 10 yrs 5yrs 10 yrs
Core Economies France 18.23 2.76 13.91 11.26 20.42 6.50 18.57 13.78 20.88 7.32
0.02 0.95 0.08 0.19 0.01 0.59 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.50
Germany 29.80 16.15 7.42 7.54 92.90 17.08 37.32 6.08 33.22 18.41
0.00 0.04 0.49 0.48 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.02
U.K. 31.39 4.61 8.14 10.42 98.16 5.16 36.45 5.19 32.30 4.69
0.00 0.80 0.42 0.24 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.79
Worrying Economies Ireland 26.36 5.42 11.96 20.67 8.61 7.78 28.76 29.14 25.91 9.25
0.00 0.71 0.15 0.01 0.38 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32
Italy 9.71 14.85 5.00 7.52 4.97 18.73 12.64 13.47 10.53 20.14
0.29 0.06 0.76 0.48 0.76 0.02 0.12 0.10 0.23 0.01
Portugal 9.58 3.58 5.63 12.29 9.38 7.88 10.70 7.71 9.63 8.42
0.30 0.89 0.69 0.14 0.31 0.45 0.22 0.46 0.29 0.39
Spain 10.12 4.82 9.63 12.79 20.16 6.13 20.67 4.40 11.77 5.64
0.26 0.78 0.29 0.12 0.01 0.63 0.01 0.82 0.16 0.69
Eastern Economies Croatia 20.55 4.59 7.82 4.09 5.25 4.02 15.03 6.08 17.50 3.60
0.01 0.80 0.45 0.85 0.73 0.86 0.06 0.64 0.03 0.89
Czech Rep. 14.04 2.32 5.89 3.34 37.83 5.17 15.47 5.00 12.39 4.41
0.08 0.97 0.66 0.91 0.00 0.74 0.05 0.76 0.13 0.82
Poland 37.89 13.97 8.45 18.26 31.71 7.75 48.58 12.31 32.38 8.89
0.00 0.08 0.39 0.02 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.35
Romania 10.66 17.65 5.47 12.19 6.44 10.28 16.13 4.17 12.70 12.78
0.22 0.02 0.71 0.14 0.60 0.25 0.04 0.84 0.12 0.12
Turkey Turkey 9.09 13.95 7.69 8.77 8.01 15.95 11.69 9.08 13.39 18.18
0.33 0.08 0.46 0.36 0.43 0.04 0.17 0.34 0.10 0.02
Greece Greece 2.87 5.10 3.64 9.87 5.39 6.65 4.72 * 5.22 6.65
0.94 0.75 0.89 0.27 0.72 0.57 0.79 * 0.73 0.57
*not available data
Jan. 1, 2010 - Apr. 25, 2015Aug. 8, 2008 - Apr. 25 ,2015 Jan. 1, 2010 - Oct. 31, 2013Aug. 8, 2008 - Jan. 1, 2010 Nov. 1, 2013 - Apr. 25, 2015
Figure 3: Table 3
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 Turkey Greece
France Germany UK Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Croatia Czech Rep. Poland Romania Turkey Greece
I 13.03 13.77 5.98 * 15.13 1.49 15.03 6.73 13.31 2.30 4.30 8.75 3.74
0.1109 0.0879 0.6494 * 0.0566 0.9929 0.0586 0.5657 0.1016 0.9705 0.8288 0.3639 0.8794
II 8.60 11.49 6.21 16.90 9.01 5.16 8.22 5.31 17.88 16.54 5.62 10.59 4.07
0.3769 0.1755 0.6232 0.0312 0.3416 0.7409 0.4127 0.7240 0.0222 0.0352 0.6897 0.2263 0.8504
III 3.41 5.04 8.74 23.82 11.20 3.34 20.87 4.47 13.11 15.97 6.36 11.79 8.12
0.9062 0.7528 0.3647 0.0025 0.1906 0.9110 0.0075 0.8122 0.1083 0.0428 0.6069 0.1609 0.4215
IV 8.96 10.45 3.74 13.73 13.57 12.39 11.66 5.53 13.25 10.12 4.47 7.94 9.19
0.3458 0.2349 0.8796 0.0890 0.0936 0.1346 0.1671 0.6999 0.1035 0.2569 0.8126 0.4397 0.3267
V 13.37 10.04 6.21 8.22 10.39 8.59 14.27 3.76 6.26 14.64 11.37 5.92 11.55
0.0998 0.2625 0.6232 0.4120 0.2386 0.3781 0.0751 0.8777 0.6184 0.0665 0.1814 0.6563 0.1726
VI 9.43 7.39 7.06 21.12 5.78 5.86 4.72 8.21 12.97 10.45 6.01 20.42 3.70
0.3070 0.4950 0.5305 0.0068 0.6720 0.6627 0.7869 0.4129 0.1127 0.2346 0.6458 0.0089 0.8833
VII 7.93 6.71 3.09 11.82 4.56 4.32 13.84 19.37 19.22 9.92 13.44 13.54 3.63
0.4408 0.5685 0.9285 0.1593 0.8039 0.8271 0.0860 0.0130 0.0137 0.2709 0.0977 0.0945 0.8885
VIII 12.67 7.77 6.32 6.58 3.85 11.35 4.50 18.52 13.77 6.92 8.70 6.25 4.30
0.1238 0.4562 0.6115 0.5829 0.8708 0.1824 0.8096 0.0176 0.0879 0.5457 0.3680 0.6193 0.8288
IX 5.06 6.82 13.15 15.95 11.26 5.91 12.20 19.01 12.31 6.81 9.31 16.75 5.28
0.7508 0.5557 0.1069 0.0431 0.1872 0.6568 0.1424 0.0148 0.1379 0.5568 0.3171 0.0328 0.7272
X 5.68 4.14 6.90 5.37 19.17 11.73 8.15 12.14 4.60 8.28 10.18 6.93 5.44
0.6830 0.8444 0.5478 0.7178 0.0140 0.1637 0.4193 0.1450 0.7998 0.4063 0.2523 0.5444 0.7095
XI 8.32 8.69 9.34 14.24 13.58 14.94 3.64 7.12 4.67 8.87 9.70 2.01 14.24
0.4029 0.3692 0.3147 0.0756 0.0934 0.0603 0.8884 0.5236 0.7926 0.3536 0.2868 0.9807 0.0757
XII 14.56 3.72 13.00 10.22 9.88 19.12 5.39 7.43 10.09 6.53 8.95 3.70 7.99
0.0684 0.8816 0.1119 0.2499 0.2735 0.0142 0.7152 0.4911 0.2589 0.5885 0.3462 0.8834 0.4345
XIII 14.13 6.79 14.39 6.90 4.37 9.90 13.05 4.76 13.86 7.05 7.58 7.36 5.71
0.0784 0.5598 0.0720 0.5471 0.8221 0.2720 0.1103 0.7825 0.0855 0.5314 0.4754 0.4982 0.6793
XIV 2.85 10.74 20.61 18.57 5.58 5.46 9.72 5.34 12.00 6.39 5.62 7.69 12.48
0.9434 0.2168 0.0083 0.0173 0.6945 0.7078 0.2851 0.7207 0.1514 0.6033 0.6893 0.4644 0.1310
XV 8.00 8.92 6.69 6.77 8.98 8.35 8.24 9.78 8.78 7.71 4.19 18.28 11.11
0.4332 0.3495 0.5709 0.5621 0.3437 0.4004 0.4108 0.2807 0.3612 0.4621 0.8398 0.0192 0.1958
XVI 5.50 14.51 10.13 8.70 7.92 8.60 12.07 11.61 10.07 10.50 6.99 21.50 5.99
0.7026 0.0694 0.2559 0.3680 0.4412 0.3773 0.1482 0.1696 0.2601 0.2318 0.5375 0.0059 0.6485
XVII 8.72 3.23 8.49 5.39 6.95 4.68 20.60 7.04 6.81 10.32 5.11 5.18 5.86
0.3666 0.9190 0.3872 0.7153 0.5419 0.7908 0.0083 0.5328 0.5577 0.2430 0.7462 0.7386 0.6634
XVIII 12.36 12.02 5.41 6.85 10.25 7.00 2.27 13.84 3.31 11.77 6.20 7.52 10.40
0.1359 0.1501 0.7132 0.5525 0.2479 0.5362 0.9715 0.0861 0.9133 0.1619 0.6243 0.4821 0.2381
XIX 8.11 18.44 3.46 12.69 9.09 4.82 9.72 10.58 3.62 12.78 6.32 4.46 8.32
0.4230 0.0182 0.9025 0.1230 0.3348 0.7768 0.2851 0.2264 0.8901 0.1195 0.6117 0.8137 0.4032
XX 4.75 19.19 4.17 7.04 6.04 8.17 6.53 8.63 8.03 6.54 12.81 8.04 *
0.7836 0.0139 0.8418 0.5323 0.6433 0.4167 0.5879 0.3740 0.4301 0.5872 0.1184 0.4291 *
XXI 10.36 17.63 8.52 9.52 9.02 6.78 10.74 7.47 10.97 4.14 7.15 4.75 *
0.2408 0.0242 0.3847 0.3001 0.3409 0.5605 0.2170 0.4873 0.2035 0.8441 0.5208 0.7839 *
XXII 9.65 8.28 9.10 5.55 12.02 6.65 10.68 11.20 10.16 4.35 4.96 15.18 *
0.2906 0.4068 0.3340 0.6972 0.1504 0.5745 0.2205 0.1906 0.2541 0.8247 0.7615 0.0557 *
XXIII 5.90 5.66 12.00 7.77 9.66 9.77 10.39 4.69 7.51 6.34 9.08 14.02 *
0.6581 0.6852 0.1512 0.4567 0.2899 0.2813 0.2388 0.7905 0.4828 0.6092 0.3356 0.0813 *
XXIV 7.25 14.97 5.63 4.77 6.12 7.55 15.99 5.72 5.35 11.23 3.40 11.72 *
0.5098 0.0596 0.6889 0.7815 0.6343 0.4783 0.0425 0.6782 0.7198 0.1888 0.9066 0.1640 *
XXV 7.25 14.97 5.63 4.77 6.12 7.55 15.99 5.72 5.35 11.23 3.40 11.72 *
0.5098 0.0596 0.6889 0.7815 0.6343 0.4783 0.0425 0.6782 0.7198 0.1888 0.9066 0.1640 *
XXVI 4.71 7.45 18.77 4.74 14.34 5.20 7.24 24.45 7.70 14.06 4.52 14.51 *
0.7877 0.4889 0.0161 0.7850 0.0733 0.7355 0.5112 0.0019 0.4637 0.0802 0.8075 0.0694 *
XXVII 12.91 9.68 20.81 2.20 5.08 10.81 7.81 23.16 5.59 13.71 8.85 5.29 *
0.1150 0.2880 0.0077 0.9741 0.7489 0.2128 0.4525 0.0032 0.6929 0.0897 0.3548 0.7263 *
XXVIII 15.45 22.36 27.40 15.74 7.32 11.82 9.62 9.86 7.66 9.83 9.09 5.80 *
0.0510 0.0043 0.0006 0.0463 0.5022 0.1593 0.2926 0.2753 0.4670 0.2773 0.3351 0.6698 *
XXIX 17.64 43.42 29.54 13.59 2.30 9.67 6.27 13.30 12.27 5.58 13.34 6.90 2.50
0.0241 0.0000 0.0003 0.0931 0.9704 0.2893 0.6168 0.1020 0.1397 0.6941 0.1005 0.5474 0.9617
XXX 18.88 24.02 14.55 10.72 6.85 6.15 10.16 17.79 12.70 10.05 18.28 11.19 2.50
0.0155 0.0023 0.0686 0.2181 0.5526 0.6306 0.2538 0.0228 0.1228 0.2616 0.0193 0.1910 0.9617
XXXI 15.44 25.32 16.60 5.24 7.46 8.51 3.49 12.31 6.43 16.94 17.91 15.90 *
0.0511 0.0014 0.0345 0.7318 0.4880 0.3855 0.9003 0.1381 0.5990 0.0307 0.0219 0.0438 *
XXXII 17.08 27.80 14.63 8.41 5.77 6.67 13.48 7.53 12.78 14.43 11.70 15.99 *
0.0293 0.0005 0.0668 0.3942 0.6730 0.5723 0.0963 0.4802 0.1197 0.0713 0.1649 0.0425 *
XXXIII 10.32 30.37 10.92 11.93 8.08 2.55 13.18 8.36 12.29 15.25 16.07 14.95 5.23
0.2430 0.0002 0.2064 0.1542 0.4260 0.9593 0.1059 0.3989 0.1388 0.0545 0.0414 0.0602 0.7328
XXXIV 9.12 21.33 8.26 10.84 9.21 8.13 12.84 10.46 5.67 16.43 7.87 9.10 3.73
0.3322 0.0063 0.4080 0.2108 0.3252 0.4212 0.1173 0.2339 0.6840 0.0366 0.4463 0.3339 0.8810
XXXV 11.35 15.82 8.50 16.42 9.20 12.67 8.65 11.83 * 14.38 5.50 6.35 8.58
0.1829 0.0451 0.3858 0.0368 0.3257 0.1238 0.3727 0.1587 * 0.0724 0.7036 0.6080 0.3790
XXXVI 9.42 19.88 12.68 15.11 11.66 6.72 16.42 18.49 * 14.26 8.05 4.83 5.14
0.3077 0.0108 0.1233 0.0571 0.1668 0.5675 0.0368 0.0178 * 0.0751 0.4289 0.7755 0.7426
XXXVII 6.63 9.52 22.12 13.87 4.51 4.69 11.13 10.76 6.87 18.58 12.90 7.51 *
0.5774 0.3003 0.0047 0.0852 0.8084 0.7901 0.1943 0.2160 0.5505 0.0173 0.1153 0.4827 *
XXXVIII 9.30 10.77 23.06 11.17 14.04 10.52 6.09 3.64 3.83 24.53 17.86 16.04 *
0.3174 0.2149 0.0033 0.1924 0.0806 0.2304 0.6373 0.8883 0.8718 0.0019 0.0223 0.0418 **Not available data
Core Economies Worrying Economies Eastern Economies
Table 4. Chi squared test by country and moving windows. In italics the p-values, the asterisks  represent 
missing data. 
Figure 4: Table 4:
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 Turkey Greece
France Germany UK Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Croatia Czech Rep. Poland Romania Turkey Greece
I 0.09 0.09 0.05 * 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.04
II 0.10 0.09 0.06 * 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.07 0.04
III 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.18 0.07 0.08 0.05
IV 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.07
V 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07
VI 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.15 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06
VII 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.06
VIII 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.07
IX 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.06
X 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.06
XI 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.07
XII 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05
XIII 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.04
XIV 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.12
XV 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.07
XVI 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.03
XVII 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.06
XVIII 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.09
XIX 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.06 *
XX 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.08 *
XXI 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 *
XXII 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.08 *
XXIII 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.09 *
XXIV 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.11 *
XXV 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.11 *
XXVI 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.12 *
XXVII 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.05 *
XXVIII 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.04 *
XXIX 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.05 *
XXX 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.07 *
XXXI 0.09 0.14 0.16 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.16 0.08 0.08 *
XXXII 0.08 0.16 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.08 *
XXXIII 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.10
XXXIV 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.04
XXXV 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.11 * 0.19 0.05 0.05 0.12
XXXVI 0.09 0.18 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.08 * 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.13
XXXVII 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.12 0.05 0.07 *
XXXVIII 0.06 0.09 0.19 0.08 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.17 0.07 0.12 *
*Not ava i lable data
Core Economies Worrying Economies Eastern Economies
Figure 5: Table 5 : Chebyshev’s distance by moving windows and country.
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 Turkey Greece
France Germany UK Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Croatia
Czech 
Rep. Poland Romania Turkey Greece
I 0.09 0.10 0.05 * 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03
II 0.09 0.07 0.06 * 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.15 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.02
III 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.20 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.05
IV 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.05
V 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.06
VI 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.02
VII 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.02
VIII 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02
IX 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.04
X 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.04
XI 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.09
XII 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.10 -0.01 0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05
XIII 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
XIV 0.02 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.08
XV 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.07
XVI 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.14 0.03
XVII 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03
XVIII 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.10
XIX 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.03 1.61
XX 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 1.75
XXI 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.03 *
XXII 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.08 *
XXIII 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.08 *
XXIV 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 *
XXV 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 *
XXVI 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.17 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.09 *
XXVII 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.17 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.03 *
XXVIII 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.04 *
XXIX 0.10 0.22 0.16 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.04 *
XXX 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.06 *
XXXI 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.08 *
XXXII 0.13 0.20 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.09 *
XXXIII 0.06 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.09 0.13
XXXIV 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.18 0.30 0.19 0.21 0.08 0.03
XXXV 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.11 * 0.16 0.06 0.06 0.08
XXXVI 0.06 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.14 * 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.25
XXXVII 0.04 0.06 0.19 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.77 0.12 0.08 0.05 *
XXXVIII 0.07 0.08 0.37 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.27 0.15 0.12 *
*Not available data
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Figure 6: Table 6 : Kullback and Leibler’s divergence by moving window and country.
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